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KIICHI TACHIBANA 
Aside from philosophers of science, even the laymen having a little 
knowledge about the methodology of science immediately associate 
:Popper' with 'falsificationism' and vice versa. 
However, unexpeetedly there are very few who unders'tand the 
falsificationism and its significance. Lakatos who was universally 
admitted as a successor of Popper misunderstood Popper's theory. 
Though the word 'unexpectedly' was used above, it might not be a 
surprise because even Popper himself seems not to understand the 
epock-making significance of his theory. 
When you read 'Science in Flux'l by Agassi, a former disciple of 
Popper, you will corne to a conclusion that Popper's successor was not 
Lakatos but is Agassi. For Agassi detects the most important point 
of Popper's theory which Popper himself seems to overlook. In a way, 
it may be more proper to say that Agassi surpasses his master, Popper. 
Viewing the recent trend of philosophy of science-from the volume, 
'Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge'2 (1970) to the volume, 'Pro-
gress and Rationality in Science'3 (1978)-it gives a (wrong) im-
pression that Popper's falsificationism has been criticized and replaced 
by Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP), 
which is now regarded as representing the position of critical ration-
alism-simply speaking, the position which defends the rationality of 
science. Again the problem of evidential support becomes the central 
problem in the philosophy of science, though the import of the evi-
dential support is changed from induction, through confirmation now 
to corroboration. You can notice the transition from falsificationism 
to corroborationism from the fact that the object of criticism has 
been changed from Popper to Lakatos. And Agassi is completely 
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neglected, especially in the volume, 'Progress and Rationality in 
Science'. 
In my opinion, this shift shows nothing but a degenerating prob-
lem shift, using Lakatos's terminology. In this short paper, some rea-
sons against corroborationism shall be offered. 
By the way, from the fact that the concept of 'falsification' is close-
ly related with the concept of 'truth' or 'falsity', it produces the 
epistemological problem : the problem of so-called empirical basis, i.e. 
the problem of the truth of basic statements, or the semantical prob-
lem : the problem of the semantical formulation of 'verisimilitude'. 
However, we shall not enter the fcrmer problem deeply nor treat the 
latter problem at all but limit our concern mainly to a methodological 
problem, i.e. how do we learn from experience. By falsification or by 
corroboration? In short, we shall treat only the empirical aspect of 
science. 
I. ON THE THIRD REQUlREMENT 
The recent concern of the philosophers of science is centered on cor-
roboration-or exactly speaking excess corroboration-which Lakatos 
placed in the center of his methodology (MSRP). Lakatos 'writes, 
"Justificationists valued 'confirming' instances of a theory ; naive 
falsificationists stressed 'refuting' instances ; for the methodological 
falsificationists it is the-rather rare-corroborating instances of the 
excess information which are the crucial ones ; . . . the fcw crucial 
excess-verifyil~g il~st(hn.ces are decisive."4 ~ 
The start of it lies in that Popper added a famous 'third require-
ment' in an essay5 which is appeared in his work, 'Conjectures and 
Refutations' (1963). In his work, 'The Logic of Scientific Dicovery'6 
(1959) , the falsification of scientific theory being stressed, corrobora-
tion was not required. For Popper corroboration was only a critical 
report of the result that the attempted falsification failed. In 'The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery', knowledge grows by conjectures and 
refutations. For the growth of knowledge corroboration was unneces-
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sary. 
However, in the essay mentioned above, Popper added the third 
requirement for the growth of knowledge. He writes, "We require 
that the theory should pass some new, and severe, tests."7 This seems 
to be a modification or a deviation from falsificationism. For this 
requirement seems to claim that falsification is not enough for the 
growth of knowledge. Using Agassi's words,8 Popper now thinks that 
conjectures, corroborations, and refutations are necessary conditions 
for the growth of knowledge. Agassi is opposed to the third requh,e-
ment as that for the growth of knowledge.9 On the other hand, Lakatos 
was willing to accept requirement, and modified it and named the 
modified one 'acceptability2"lo 
There are two problems concerning corroboration. Is corroboration 
indispensable for the growth of knowledge ? Does corroboration have 
something to do with the empirical character of science ? 
II. IS C,ORROBORATION INDISPENSABLE 
FOR THE GROWTH OF KN,O'WLEDGE ? 
Before we examine Popper's arguments for the third requirement, 
we have to take note of two points. (1) Popper himself is aware of 
the strangeness of this requirement.n (2) He points out that this 
requirement clearly cannot be indispensable.12 Rather, Popper is hesi-
tating between falsificationism and corroborationism. 
According to Popper, philosophers are classified as belonging to two 
main groups ; (1) the verificationist philosophers of knowledge, (2) 
the falsificationist philosophers of knowledge.13 Corroborationism is 
a residue of verificationist modes of thought,14 not belonging to the 
group of falsificationisrn. Therefore, Popper cannot obtain both falsi-
ficationism and corroborationism at the same time. He cannot be 
doubly blessed. 
Popper's supportive arguments for the third requirement are devided 
mainly two parts. A. factual or psychological arguments, B. Iogical 
or methodological arguments. Let us consider each argument in detail. 
76 
A.1 Without the third requirement, further progress in science 
would become impossible.1*< 
However, the corroboration which is mentioned here is not the 
corroboration of a theory but that of new effects. Of course, the 
discovery of new facts is indispensable. But it has nothing to do with 
the 60rroboration of a theory. 
A.2 Without the third requirement, science would stagnate, and 
lose its ernpirical character.16 
In order to support this argument, Popper introduces a new kind 
of definition of ad hocness. If a theory which is independently testable 
should not pass the independent test, it is ad hoc, for it is always 
possible, by a trivial strategem, to make an ad hoc theory independent-
ly testable by connecting it with any testable but not yet tested fa7htas-
tic ad hoc prediction which may occur to us (or to some scie7~ce 
ficti07h writer) .17 
However, concerning the prediction of unknown facts, is it possible 
to know whether it is fantastic or not before test? If it is known in 
advance, it is not independently testable, and if it is not known in 
advance, one cannot assert that it is a fantastic prediction. In con-
nection with this argument, Popper, mentioning Giedymin's general 
methodological principle of empiricism : Nature must be able to defeat 
us at least sometimes, says that 'If we drop our third requirement, 
then we can always win.'18 However, is not the third requirement 
rather a requirement that we sometimes have to win the battle with 
Nature ? A theory which did not fulfil the third requirement, for 
e~:ample, the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory, was defeated by Nature. 
Therofore, without the third requirement it is pos~*ible to lose all the 
time, but it is impossible to always win. 
A theory, if it is gelvui7hely independently testable, is not ad hoc 
A.3 Without the third requirement, a theory would be a mere 
instrument of exploration.19 
However, fcr Popper the concept of 'truth' is a regulative principle 
or idea which is beyond human reach. Therefore, all theories which 
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men invent cannot be true. That is, they are nothing but stepping 
stones, aiming at the truth and guessing about the structure of the 
world. In a sense, they may be instruments but they are instruments 
by which we try to get nearer to the truth. They are never instru-
ments in terms of instrumentalism.20 
A.4 If we should only succeed in refuting our theories but not in 
obtaining some verifications of predictions of a new kind, we might 
decide that our scientific problems have become too difficult for us 
because the structure (if any) of the world is beyond our powers of 
comprehension. Therefore, for us to fulfil the third requirement, we 
need a world whose mathematical structure is not so intricate as to 
make progress impossible.21 
What on earth does this assertion mean ? Does it mean that in 
order to succeed in corroboration, the world must not be so very 
different from the world as we know? Do not you think it is strange ? 
We are going to show this strangeness by using Agassi's thought 
ex periment. 
Agassi says, 'Consider a universe in which science is almost like 
ours, with series of conjectures, some of which are tested, but in 
which, by luck or otherwise, every test is successful ; that is to say, 
in that universe every test refutes a theory. Query : does that universe 
have science proper or not? Popper's a7vswer must be ilh the cbffir77b 
ative.'22 However, as you know from Popper's above argument, his 
answer is unexpectedly i7b the 7~egative! 
Popper is aware of the fact that the arguments, which are examined 
above, have only psychological effects or encouragement.23 Then he 
produces three more reasons for the third requirement, which, he in-
sists, are logical or methodological. 
B.1 We know that if we had an independently testable theory whic.h 
was, qrboreovre, true, then it would provide us with successful predic-
tions (and only with successful ones). Successful predictions . . . are 
therefore at least necessary condition for the truth of an independent.ly 
testable theory. In this sense-and only in this sense-our third re-
quirement may even be said to be 'necessary', if we seriousty accept 
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truth as a regulative idea.24 
This argument is connected with the former (A.3) argument. How-
ever, if we seriously accept truth as a regulative idea, we cannot ob-
tain the comprehensively true theory. In other words, every theory 
is doomed to be refuted. It is a deviation from falsificationism to 
require the unrefutable, true theory. 
B.2 If it is our aim to strengthen the verisimilitude of our theo-
ries, or to get nearer to the truth, then we should be anxious not 
only to reduce the falsity-content of our theories but also to strengthen 
their truth-content.25 
However, even if an independently testable theory is refuted by the 
first severe test, its truth-content as well increases. Lakatos has al-
ready compared two models of scientific growth, Popperian model and 
Agassite model. So we are going to use only the descriptive side of 
hi*~ comparisons. 
(1) A major theory To, accepted2, is refuted by a minor falsifying 
hypothesis fl' which is also accepted2' The (relevant part of the) body 
of science in both models consist of To and fi. 
(2) T1 is proposed. T1 is bold, explains all the truth-content of 
To as well as fl ; its excess content is el' But el is 'fully refuted', T1 
is rejected2' The refuting hypothesls is f2 and it is accepted2' 
In the Popperian model the body of science now consists of To, fl' f2' 
In the Agassite model is consists of T1 and f2' 
(3) T2 is proposed. T2 is bold, explains all the truth-content 
of Tl as well as f2 ; its excess content is e2' But e2 is 'fully refuted', 
T2 is rejected. The refuting hypothesis is f3 and it is accepted2' 
In the Popperian model the body of science now consists of To, fl' 
f2' f3' In the Agassite model it consists of T2 and f3' And so on.26 
Even in the Agassite model, the truth-content of T2 is greater than 
that of T1' and T2 is greater than To' For while To fails to explain fl' 
T1 explains fl' i.e. T1 includes the truth-content of fl' Similarly, while 
T1 fails to explain f2, T2 explains f2, i.e. T2 includes the truth-content 
of Ti, f2, or of To, fl' f2' 
B 3 In sclence clucral experrments ale declsrvely unportant, but 
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without the third requirement, it would be impossible to do crucial 
ex periments.27 
However, for example, there is a crucial experiment between To 
and T1' For while To cannot explain fl' T1 explains fl' Besides there 
is another crucial test of f2 against T1' 
Incidentally, Lakatos proposes another argument for the third re-
quirement. He argues as follows : 
"Following the line of Agassi's argument, Iet us imagine that after 
To and fl' T2 is immediately proposed. T2 will then be acceptedl and 
also accepted2' fcr f2 is part of its excess content. Now why should 
{To' T1' T2} represent a degenerative shift when {To' T2} represents 
a progressive shift? The argument is interesting. But instead of 
being an argument agai7~st the 'Popperian model', it gives a final touch 
to its clarification. According to Popper, the essence of science is 
growth ; fast potential growth (acceptabilityl) and fast actual growth 
(acceptability2) ' Slow growth is not good enough to live up to Popper's 
ideal image of science. If imagination does not fy fast enough ahead 
of the discovery of facts, science degenerates."28 
However, this requirement demands that man should be more 
imaginative or rather demands that the world should not be so intri-
cate. This demand is strange enough, as we pointed out in A.4. 
III. DOES CORROB.ORATION HAVE SOMETHING 
TO DO WITH 
THE EMPIRICAL CHARACTER OF SCIENCE ? 
So far we criticized mainly Popper's arguments for the third re 
quirement one by one. However, there is a strong argument against 
the third requirement. Of course it is not our invention but Popper's. 
It is ironical to use Popper's argument against Popper. Logically 
speaking, as Popper notices,29 it is irrelevant whether the supporting 
evidences preceed or follow in time the invension of the theory. For 
the logical relation between the prediction of new facts and a theory 
and the logical relation between the explanation of the known facts 
72 
~nd a theory are the same. Both are deducible from' the theory plus 
the initial conditions. According to Popper, the statements of the 
pr~dicted new facts and the statements of the explained known facts 
are both instantial statements of the theory which succeeded in pre-
diction and explanation. And instantial statements have no empirical 
chafacter of the scientific theory.30 For according to Popper, the 
empirical content of a theory is determined by ( and equal to ) the 
class of those observational statements, or basic statements, which 
c07btrcbdict the theory, I~ot the class of all observational statements 
which follow from the theory.31 
' Successful predictions belong not to the empirical content of the 
theoty but rather to its logical content. Therefore, successful pre-
dictions have nothing to do with the empirical cha~acter of a theory. 
So we cannot accept Popper's following staternent. 
"Yet I believe that we should feel that, e.specially fcr the function-
ing of its eqmpirical side, both kinds of successes are essential : suc-
cess in refuting our theories, and success on the part of some of 
our theories in resisting at least some of our most determined at-
tempts to refute them."32 
When a theory is falsified, i.e, its potential falsifiers turn to be 
actual, they constitute the empilrcal content of the theoly Popper 
says, "De mortius nil nisi beme : once a theory is refuted, its empirical 
character is secure and shines without blemish."33 On the other hand, 
when a theory is corroborated, i.e. its potential falsifiers turn to be 
false, or negations of its potential falsifiers become actual, we find 
that they do not constitute the empirical content of the theory. There-
fcre, we do not obtain empirical knowledge from corroboration, the 
successful prediction, but only from falsification. 
A word about rationality. From corroborationist point of view it 
is rational fcr scientists to accept a theory as far as it is better cor-
roborated than another theory or is excess corroborated. However, 
it is quite difficult to ascertain excess corroboration. For, as mentioned 
earlier, prediction and explanation are of the same logical relation 
to a theory. It is usual that successful explanation of known fact 
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cannot be counted as a corroboration because there is no severe test 
to it. Then corroborationists have to distinguish the success of pre-
diction from the explanation of the known facts. They have to in-
vestigate which instances a scientist knew when he constructed his 
theory. In order to do that, they cannot do logical investigation. Thus 
the problem of the growth of knowledge has been shifted from logical 
one to socio-historical one.34 However, for falsificationists it is possi-
ble to do logical analysis to the problem of the groWth of knowledge. 
In the sense that falsification occ.urs in the history, falsification has 
a historical character. But falsification is a falsification, whether it 
preceeds or follows historically the construction of the theory. You 
do not have to adopt historical, sociological appr'oach. Therefore, for 
falsificationists the recent problem shift seems to be degenerating, 
or rather to be mistaken. Corroboration has nothing to do with the 
empirical knowledge at all. It is nothing but an optical illusion as 
Popper asserted against induction.3~< 
Does it mean the collapse of rationality of science? For corrobora-
tionalists it seems to be so. However, for falsificationists not at all. 
From falsificationist point of view, it is rational for scientists to admit 
falsifications after they attempt to countercriticize the falsifications, 
and then to try to overcome the difficulties or problems which are 
produced from the falsifications. Some scientists may test the falsified 
theory as far as it has independently testable consequences. Or some 
may try to ascertain the limit of the explanatory power of a theory. Or 
some may boldly attempt to construct a new theory,which will explain 
the mistakes of the previous theory and its falsifying instances, or a 
bolder theory which has independently testable consequences. It is 
possible to say that they are all rational as far as they do not ignore 
verious kinds of falsifications when they notice them. In short, it is 
rational to admit mistakes as mistakes. 
However, some critics of falsificationism may ask how we can admit 
mistakes as mistakes. They may criticize falsificationism as fcllows. 
It might be true that concerning the universal statements, by which 
scientific theories are formulated, there is an asyrnmetry between 
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truth and falsity. For we cannot verify scientific theories but can 
falsify them. But how about basic statements, which we use as the 
means of testing a scientific theory ? In order to falsify a basic state-
ment, we ccmnot but cbccept another bc~sic stcetevne7bt c~s true. Falsifica-
tion of a basic statement presupposes verification of another state-
ment. Without verification, falsification is impossible. Therefore, if 
one cannot insist on the truth of a basic statement, one cannot insist 
on the falsify of another basic statement, either. Therefore, we can 
never identify that such and such statements are mistaken, i.e. false. 
The point is this. While falsificationism depends on the doctrine 
of asymmetry between truth and falsity, its critics deny the asymmeL 
try. Which is right? We can counter-criticize the denial of the asym-
metry. As Popper says, any statements are transcendent from ex-
perience.36 Therefore, there is always possibility of errors in them. 
One can criticize them, i.e. w~ can insist on the falsity of them. 
Basic statements are not exception. We can criticize any basic state-
ments when we doubt them. Sometimes criticism may succeed. Some 
times criticism may be rebutted by counter-criticism. Both criticism 
and counter-critieism are attempts of falsification. We can only say 
that the target for our criticism is doubtful or false. We do not have 
to assert that the statements, on which our criticism are based, are 
true. For when we accept some statements, we always accept them 
as the result of a critical examination, i.e, because of the failure of 
an attempted falsification. We do 7bot (~ccept theq7b (bs true. On the 
other hand, when we reject some statements, we reject them as false. 
For, as Popper says, "such things as obscurity or confusion may indi 
cate error, . . . incoherence and inconsistency do establish falsehood."37 
In each stage we can always adopt negative or critical approach to 
any statements, without being committed to justification or verification 
of any kinds. 
In science falsification is not a vice but a virtue. We have to assign 
rather plus marhs for falsification.38 Rationality is defined by our 
ignorance, not by knowledge. 
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